A big detail, an important
one, but part of Iraq’s past rather than its future. For many
Iraqis, Saddam Hussein’s fate is of little importance His conviction
and sentence simply deepened the feelings that already existed about
him.
People who thought he was a
monster who had brought disaster to his country had their beliefs
confirmed. And so did those who looked back on his reign with
nostalgia, as a time when Iraq was stable, and the streets were safe
as long as you supported his regime.
His chaotic, noisy execution
probably won’t change that. The BBC team in Baghdad reports that for
every person who saw a leader, bearing himself in his final moments
with dignity there was another who saw a brutal dictator getting
what he deserved.
The bitter sectarian divide
between Shia and Sunni Muslims might be deepened by the execution.
But thinking too much about Saddam is a luxury in a country that is
already in the grip of a series of terrible wars.
The Iraqi people, who suffered
grievously under Saddam, continue to suffer. The most urgent issue
is what the United States, the country most responsible for the
disaster in Iraq, is going to do next.
Does it have it in its power
to make things better? Can it make matters worse? The answer to the
first is maybe; to the second, it’s definitely. The one point of
agreement in Washington about their position in Iraq is that it is
bad.
Even President Bush now says
"We’re not winning, we’re not losing" in Iraq. Soon, he is expected
to announce some decisions about what the Americans do next in Iraq.
It looks as if he may not take
the advice that was in the recent report by the foreign policy
grandees led by the former Secretary of State James Baker and the
former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton.
Their opening line was
succinct, and more accurate than the President’s description: "The
situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating."
The Baker-Hamilton report, at
first, seemed to offer the Americans a way out. It recommended
switching US forces from combat to training Iraqis - and asked for a
diplomatic initiative that would engage all the countries of the
region.
But the report was also a
polite, but firm denunciation of the ideologically driven foreign
policy of the Bush Administration.
Even before Christmas, it
looked as if swallowing it would be too much for the White House.
There was even talk of sending more troops to Iraq.
What also emerged much more
clearly towards the end of 2006 was the capacity of the killing in
Iraq to pull in its neighbours.
The Saudis have been gravely
concerned about the impact of the American invasion of Iraq since
before it happened, and that feeling has deepened.
A number of recent reports
have suggested that Saudi Arabia would intervene in Iraq to protect
its Sunni minority, with whom there are strong tribal and religious
ties, if the Americans decided to get out.
That may be one factor pushing
the Americans to stay the course in Iraq.
The Saudis are acutely
conscious of the way that Iran has been, so far, the big winner in
the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its
friends.
The US obligingly removed
Saddam Hussein, Iran’s biggest enemy in the region, and broke the
Sunni ascendancy in Iraq.
Thanks to the Americans, Shia
Iran has Shia Muslim allies in top jobs in the Iraqi government and
military. Iraq is now a major exporter of instability.
In 2003 the American-led
invasion threw a big rock into the pool of the Middle East.
It has kicked up waves, not
ripples, which will wash around the region long after Saddam Hussein
is dead and buried.